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The Government of Iraq viewed rehabilitation of infrastructure contaminated with explosives during the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a prerequisite to socioeconomic recovery and political stability, which, in turn, established a need for the mine action community to deploy qualified, 
certified clearance teams as quickly as possible. While these teams could deploy quickly, their reliance on inter-
national staff and their associated costs attributable to security and other factors introduced a high overhead 
business model that became an accepted standard during a first clearance phase from 2015 to 2019, despite the 
understanding that this model could not be sustained indefinitely. A shift in donor priorities and reduced budgets 
effectively introduced a second clearance phase beginning in 2020. The challenge to the mine action community 
became the development of a more cost-effective, time-sensitive approach to clearance so as to reduce costs to 
levels acceptable to donors without compromising clearance standards.
In response, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and 
measurement of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery introduced a low cost, high return 
business model. This model offered a more efficient approach when compared to previous like-for-like models, in 
addition to providing useful tool sets applicable for other locations and conditions similar to those found in Iraq. 
As of December 2017, west Mosul was heavily contaminated not only with explosive remnants of war (ERW) but 
also with what proved to be thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left by ISIL. These devices denied 
access to sites and infrastructure, thereby delaying the complicated task of render safe/removal efforts consis-
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Phase 1: The Problem
The urgency and conditions that determined the need to deploy 
qualified, certified clearance teams quickly also de facto dictated the 
terms for what became the Phase 1 business model of clearance, lasting 
roughly from 2015 to 2019. 
During Phase 1, UNMAS relied on international commercial 
companies (ICC) for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and impro-
vised explosive device disposal (IEDD) expertise despite their rela-
tive high cost attributable (1) to their reliance on foreign experts; 
and, concomitantly, (2) to their need for protection provided by pri-
vate security detachments. 
Although costly, the model achieved the desired results. From 
2016 to 2020, explosive hazard (EH) clearance teams under 
UNMAS-managed contracts performed 1,823 clearance tasks, ren-
dering safe/removing 67,335 EH while clearing 10.6 million sq m of 
land and counting.3 
Yet, at the end of 2019, an estimated 2,522 sq km in an area formerly 
occupied by ISIL remained contaminated (see Figure 1) while budgets 
available to support clearance began to decline, partly because donor 
priorities and strategies had changed. Nonetheless, for the Government 
of Iraq, rebuilding and rehabilitating infrastructure remained critical 
and depended upon EH clearance to proceed despite the ongoing risks 
posed by ISIL insurgents and related security costs (see Figure 2, ISIL 
Activity); and therein, lay the crux of the business problem entering 
Phase 2: do more with less.
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Figure 1. Explosive hazard contamination in Iraq, UNMAS Information Management Unit, 4 February 2021.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
 Phase 1: The Factors
 
From the outset, UNMAS realized the high overhead model could 
not be sustained indefinitely, and several factors drove its change.
Security. UNMAS recognized that, effectively, it was managing a 
hybrid clearance situation: neither peacekeeping nor humanitarian due 
to the continuing security threats. After their retreat from Mosul in 
December 2017, ISIL’s remaining fighters did not leave; they switched 
from conventional warfare to guerilla tactics in an 
effort to deny recovery and maintain de facto control 
in the one-third of Iraq they once occupied. Some 
disappeared literally underground, while others hid 
in plain sight among sympathizers, at times targeting 
clearance teams. According to UN security analysts, 
2020 set a new record for ISIL incidents (Figure 2). 
This hybrid situation remains very much a concern 
and a factor for a low cost, high return model. 
Time. Data analysis by UNMAS since December 
2017 has shown time-on-task varies as a function 
of (1) events leading to contamination; (2) extent of 
contamination; (3) environment type; (4) exposure 
of operators based on the device and/or its design; 
(5) operators’ experience, (i.e., skills and assets 
appropriate for clearance and safe removal of threats 
as assessed); and (6) events beyond operational con-
trol, (e.g., security and COVID-19 restrictions), which either disrupt 
or delay clearance operations. 
Measurement. UNMAS reasoned that these factors when mea-
sured systematically4 could provide an evidence-based estimate of 
relative hazardousness for contaminated areas with implications for 
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Figure 2. Comparison of open source and Amaq (ISIL News Agency) data as 
compiled by, and courtesy of Joint Analysis Unit (JAU), United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 27 January 2021.
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consistent with IMAS standards; and, importantly, for team compo-
sition, training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately 
trained for each task). Accordingly, by mid-2019, UNMAS began 
development of what became a lethality index, which—for the first 
time—classified clearance tasks according to environment and techni-
cal factors (see Time), and assigned values for locations, thereby pro-
viding an evidence-based measurement of lethality with implications 
for skillset, time, and cost. The more lethal the task, and the longer 
the time required for render safe and removal, the greater the skills 
required and associated hourly cost. 
Fit-for-purpose. At the same time, UNMAS began evaluating 
alternative team compositions and, by mid-2019, introduced on a trial 
basis a light version based on the decades-old, proven rapid response 
team (RRT) concept.5 These highly-mobile, cost-effective teams relied 
exclusively on fully-trained Iraqi staff for high-risk search (HRS), EOD, 
IEDD, and geographic information systems (GIS) reporting, equipped 
with integral medical support, and deployable anywhere in the liber-
ated areas of Iraq within a twenty-four-hour period. The RRTs were 
backed by a single, on-call international technical advisor who did not 
deploy. The RRTs relied on local security, eliminating the constraints 
and costs associated with predominately international staff and less 
mobile-heavy teams equipped with mechanical assets. 
Repositioning. UNMAS positioned itself to (1) rewrite the way 
business was conducted through statements of work based on evidence- 
based data measuring time-on-task as a function of relative diffi-
culty (the lethality index) and validated operational concepts (e.g., 
RRT teams) that could provide both flexibility in tune with changing 
requirements and tasks as received from the Directorate of Mine Action 
(DMA), Iraq’s national mine action authority; and (2) deliver results 
meeting IMAS standards at reduced costs and a higher rate of return. 
Expediency. If the new ideas being developed offered a poten-
tial low-cost, high-return business model, UNMAS also would need 
to change its statements of work, which initially focused on specific 
requirements for clearance teams and their capability rather than out-
comes, thereby introducing an unintended bias into the process that 
favored ICCs largely for reason of expediency: Given that their accredi-
tation, team composition, and readiness to deploy solved the urgency 
issue, ICCs became the only viable clearance solution in the short term. 
Double jeopardy. As of 2018, this safe choice pattern began to 
repeat. New contracts nearly always specified size, capability, and 
scope that favored bidders with similar, previous experience. This 
generic, more-of-the-same approach de facto endorsed the ICC profile 
as a norm for clearance teams, negating nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGO) cost advantages. Since virtually all ICC teams were domi-
nated by large numbers of international personnel, their statements of 
work built in higher personnel and security costs as an accepted cost 
of doing business. NGOs accredited for clearance in Iraq could there-
fore find themselves responding to statements of work that assumed 
security costs based on an ICC model despite NGOs’ reliance on less 
costly local staff as well as associated operational advantages, includ-
ing a reduced security requirement, thereby negating their competi-
tive advantage while adopting the ICC’s disadvantages. This situation 
would not begin to change until late 2018 when UNMAS awarded its 
first commercial contract for EH clearance in Iraq to an NGO. 
Phase 2: The Changes
 Statements of Work. The experience of Phase 1 strongly sug-
gested other changes were necessary including re-design of statements 
of work, the part of each contract that detailed the methodology for 
delivery of services using an effects-based approach toward delivery of 
services.6 By 2019, UNMAS was developing evidence-based measure-
ment useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the 
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team concept 
(the RRTs) which, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return 
model sought for a Phase 2. 
Effects-based. This inherently fairer approach gave potential 
clearance partners more freedom and an opportunity to focus on 
outcomes rather than dictating means of delivery. Thereby, UNMAS 
not only achieved a desired outcome but also tested potential clear-
ance partners’ existing knowledge while encouraging a just enough 
approach to resources, thus promoting innovation and cost-effective-
ness while meeting IMAS standards. 
Accordingly, consistent with its evidence-based measurement and 
agile, flexible team concepts, future statements of work were framed 
using an effects-based approach to clearance delivery around the fol-
lowing parameters:
• Intelligence analysis. UNMAS includes an initial work 
package based on lethality index measurements to ensure that 
clearance partners base their proposals on a thorough and 
evidence-based assessment of the intended geographical area, 
the impact of the conflict there, its IED and EH threat charac-
teristics, likely task types, and mobility/travel requirements.7
• Requirements. Clearance partners use environmental and 
technical factors8 derived from UNMAS intelligence analysis as 
a guide to ensure adequacy of delivery proposals. 
• Capability. Clearance partners demonstrate their capability 
to deliver the required clearance outcome(s) through a detailed 
analysis of tasks, and their working procedures and practices as 
meeting relevant national/international standards.
• Enhancement. Clearance partners include mentoring and 
development of both individual and team skills in a logical way 
such that teams can plan, deliver, and report effectively on the 
task types they have been trained to conduct: capacity enhance-
ment is as important as clearance.
• Risk management. Clearance partners demonstrate a 
dynamic and proactive approach to risk management to pre-
defined levels that are “as low as reasonably practicable.” 
Transition. By 2019, UNMAS Iraq had worked through details of a 
two-step approach as agreed with its procurement partners to transi-
tion to an effects-based approach and was ready with a first clearance 
contract, including a statement of work based on three parameters 
open to both ICCs and NGOs. Accordingly, UNMAS aimed to
3
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• shorten the mobilization phase by providing precise environ-
mental and technical information related to current and poten-
tial locations, thereby ensuring ICCs and NGOs could reflect 
this information in terms of proposed team composition and 
equipment as cost effectiveness/value for money;
• limit international staff and increase national staff levels and 
ownership, both of which are consistent with a commitment to 
mentoring and development of national resources along with 
cost reduction; and
• ensure proper oversight by linking the operational delivery to a 
pilot study using an UNMAS risk management tool set dating 
from contract signature onward, affording a visibility of risk so 
that UNMAS could comment and/or intervene constructively 
and developmentally to address concerns at any time.
This first step in the transition to full effects-based clearance activi-
ties was delivered with a contract for clearance in Ninewa that com-
menced in January 2020, followed by the second step in October 2020 
when the new grant partnership model was signed and initiated. 
Statements of work for a two-year time frame included management, 
programs, operations, support, quality assurance, leadership, risk 
management, and resource mobilization as parameters in anticipa-
tion of fully-qualified, Iraqi-managed clearance capability sustained 
by international and national NGOs. 
Phase 3: The Transition
Even as UNMAS was developing an evidence-based measurement 
tool useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the 
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team con-
cept that, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return model 
sought in Phase 2, the experience of Phase 1 strongly suggested other 
changes were necessary. These included a transition in advance of an 
UNMAS exit to a stronger leadership role for DMA. During this tran-
sition, UNMAS saw itself moving into a consulting role, gradually 
transferring ownership of the day-to-day management of clearance 
tasks under contract. By mid-2019, UNMAS Iraq had introduced four 
management initiatives to guide those making decisions on both sides 
while managing the expectations of all, namely: 
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Jun-18 10,232,049 179,472 Urban Complex ICC 3 Mosul
Feb-18 11,156,652 164,188 Urban Complex ICC 1 Mosul
Aug-20 2,786,194 Urban Complex ICC 2 Mosul
Table 1.
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Dec-18 7,486,814 639,450 Rural Simple ICC 3 Sinjar
Aug-18 8,509,911 2,089,806 Rural Simple ICC 3 Kirkuk































































































































Contract Cost: Complex Urban
Figure 3. Figure 4.
• Partnership. UNMAS would approach operational oversight 
and quality assurance on a cooperative basis, with an emphasis 
on coaching and mentoring delivery partners so as to build local 
capacity, confidence, and independence. 
• Sustainability. Delivery partners should train initially with 
minimal direct international technical supervision so as to 
strengthen and sustain national capability to the point that it is 
self-sustaining and self-supervising.
• Identity. National capability should represent the ethnography 
of the areas it operates within, thus bolstering acceptance of 
clearance teams and their work. 
• Gender. UNMAS and the DMA would share a leadership role 
to assure that all strategic, managerial, and operational decision-
making, planning, and participation would reflect both women’s 
and men’s experiences, needs, and perspectives.
4
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 25
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/25
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION124
Benefits 
The benefits of an effects-based approach to clearance deliv-
ery are clear, beginning with the most important: a sustain-
able, fully-national, and non-profit clearance capability. Three 
additional benefits are worth noting:
• Value for money. A reduction in the contracted cost of 
like-for-like clearance contracts by a factor of five during 
a two-year period, largely as a result of reduced reliance 
on international personnel and related security require-
ments, while maintaining IMAS quality standards.
• Ownership. Locally-recruited teams generate both 
acceptance and sustainability, eliminate accommoda-
tion costs, and require only a locally-based office to 
sustain operations. Any required international staff can 
work remotely with travel limited to quality assurance, 
technical oversight, or training purposes until they are 
no longer required.
• Redefined role. Relationship with delivery part-
ners is now based on a clear definition of pragmatic 
outcomes, when-needed support, and operational and 
quality oversight. 
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Jun-18 6,374,302 183,906 Mixed ICC 1 RRT
 Sep-18 3,996,182 111,235 Mixed NGO 1 SAD
 Jun-18 3,782,356 740,146 Mixed NGO 2 Ninewa
Jul-19 3,691,709 Mixed NGO 1 Anbar























































Contract Costs: Mixed Simple 2D & 3D
The Future of “Just Enough”
UNMAS Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and measure-
ment of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery 
offers a logical and coherent approach to planning, reduced cost, and 
performance gains when compared to previous like-for-like projects, 
and useful tool sets applicable for other locations as well. Most 
important, the timing of this low cost, high return model coincides 
with the on-going transfer of UNMAS Iraq’s evolving role and trans-
fer of remaining clearance activities and related management to DMA 
as part of a well-planned exit strategy. 
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